We are in Dayton for our goddaughter’s graduation, so that is the only reason I have a breather right now.  I thought I would take the time to comment on a topic I have seen in my inbox this  month.  Several articles by several different persons have been forwarded to me about Christopher West and the fallout from his Nightline interview.  He has been taking quite a bit of heat for it.  According to some (Alice von Hildebrand and David Schindler), it is not simply the case that West was taken out of context and misconstrued,  but rather that he has some underlying problems in his anthropology.

First for some caveats and disclosures: I cannot speak as an expert on Christopher West’s interpretation of John Paul II’s Theology of the Body, as I have read and/or heard relatvely little of his thought.  However, I have read and heard some and have found that I share some of the concerns being presented.  I know David Schindler.  I took a course from him at the John Paul II Institute which, by the way, served as the inspiration for the title of this blog.  He was also a reader for my dissertation.  I do not always agree with Schindler’s take on John Paul II. I think it is often too heavily read through his “Balthasarian lens.”  However, I do think that some of Schindler’s criticisms are well-founded, and these criticisms will be the focus of this post.  I don’t claim to be the world’s foremost expert on John Paul II or his theology of the body, but I do consider myself to have an above-average expertise, as this was the foundation of my dissertation, and I have taught undergraduate courses on the theology of the body for several years.

Schindler begins with some apparently rather questionable statements that Christopher West has made.  Oftentimes, these questionable statements can seem to be reconciled with orthodoxy when contextualized, but even in doing so, Schindler says that there is a residual problem.  Schindler lists four issues he sees with West’s approach, and also with the substance of his theology.  These Schindler sees as giving rise to what many find vulgar and prurient in West’s approach.

Schindler first lists West’s underestimation of the damage done to humanity by concupiscence.  Schindler refers to his having brought this up to West a number of years ago.  I recall Schindler’s having mentioned this discussion (back in 2003, I think it was).  He mentioned West’s problematic dismissal of the perduring effects of concupiscence and West’s response.  However, I also recall that I did not agree with the way the Schindler seemed to frame the meaning of concupiscence.  He seemed to reify it as some positive reality then, as something that resides in the body.  His statement in the above linked article also intimates this understanding.  Nevertheless, what I have heard from West seems to suggest to me that he does in fact underestimate the impact of concupiscence on the human person.  Redemptive grace in this dispensation does not remove concupiscence, and concupiscence in sexual attraction cannot be ignored.  West seems to forget this, though “Christopher” of this blog, who has recently taken a class from West, indicated that West is reconsidering his take on concupiscence.

I have the impression of West that he seems to consider puritanism as a greater threat than the sexual libertinism of the sexual revolution.  I seem to recall seeing this written by him, but if I am wrong about this, I apologize.  However, if it is true, it would explain many things about his overemphasis on sex which Schindler thinks arises from his lack of a proper sense of the analogia entis (the analogy of being), which takes its archetype in God but never forgets that the difference between God and His creation is greater than the similarity.  Puritanism is a distortion of chastity.  Libertinism is a rebellion against not only puritanism but also against chaste virtue.

West seems to think that concupiscence can and must be defeated.  This is impossible.  Temptation must be overcome and defeated but concupiscence remains for the entirety of this lifetime.  Concupiscence is not an object to be defeated.  Concupiscence is a privation of integrity between the affects (i.e. emotions and appetites) on the one hand and the intellect and will on the other.  The original state was one of integration among these faculties, which we had only because of original grace–but this is how we were created–we were created for grace.  This integrity can be provisionally restored to a greater or lesser extent by cooperating with sanctifying grace, but the proclivity to sin always remains, and so it must not be tempted.  West can seem to dismiss this.  In doing so, it seems that he is falling into the error of presuming upon God’s grace in order to reject the admonition to avoid the near temptation of sin.  God’s grace can transform us if we cooperate it, but in our fallen state this is not a straight path that one can achieve simply through the force of will or by a quietist presumption on grace.

Schindler criticizes West for a lack of Marian sensitivities in his theology of the body. The way Schindler describes this is pure Balthasar and so it is not fair, I think, to consider this a failure. John Paul’s theology is certainly sympathetic with Balthasar’s Mariology, and good arguments cans be made that he incorporated this to some degree in his own thinking.  At most this should be proposed as a corrective to West’s prurience but not a fault in West’s theology.  Hildebrand argued that West loses the mystery of the person by his lack of sensitivity to the dangers of concupiscence.  This I think I have seen.  It is, I think, the reason behind his inability to discern what is inappropriate or vulgar and what is not.

Puritanism and sexual libertinism are both threats.  The former because it set the stage for justification of the latter.  However, both reject the authentic meaning of the human person and the sacredness of the body.  The danger is (and I think that this is the trap that West falls into) that the response of one who suffers from puritanical thinking can look very much like the response of one who has an authentic anthropology and responds out of a desire for purity.  That is, when subjected to sights that might be a temptation both will turn away.  The puritan because he thinks that the naked body is dirty or evil and the wannabe saint because he realizes that the goodness of the naked body is sacred, and in his fallen state he can be tempted to reduce the other to his sexual value.  Furthermore, there is a stewardship for the weaknesses of others that must be observed in order to protect them from temptations.

When inadvertantly subjected to experiences that can lead to lust, one does indeed have the obligation through self-mastery to overcome the temptation.  However, one also has the obligation to avoid the near temptation of sin.  It is ill advised, indeed it can be sinful, to  subject oneself purposefully to anything with which Satan or our simple fallenness can use to draw us more easily into sin.  Everyone is different.  Men and women are tempted differently.  Men tend to reduce women to their sexual value for the sake of pleasure.  Women tend to reduce men to the latter’s ability to meet their need for complementary bonding and personal fulfillment.  Among men, however, temperament, experience, history of subjection to pornography, etc. all factor into what can lead to temptations and how difficult it is to master oneself in this regard.  One may not sin in a misguided attempt to attain self-mastery. Neither may I assume that what I can safely be subjected to is the standard for everyone.

West’s use of images that offend the sensibilities of many good Catholics seems to be motivated by the fact that he thinks that puritanism is the root cause for their offense.  He needs to be reminded that puritanism is a relatively recent phenomenon and that chastity and purity are age old virtues.  While it is true that some cultures are not offended by things sexual that do offend others (a point I recall West often making), one must not draw conclusions based upon superficial assessments.  Lack of offense does not imply purity in reception.  Cultures in which men and women are both publicly naked must not be assumed to show that public nakedness is a possibility for a society that wants to achieve purity.  In fact, these cultures rarely show a high regard for women and their sexuality.

Ok, enough blathering and back to the question: is Christopher West’s interpretation of theology of the body dangerous?  First, I will say that I wish that this discussion could go on in private because it serves to give comfort and aid to dissenters and can undermine a good apostolate that West has developed, albeit, one that is in need of some course corrections. However, with respect to the question,  I suspect that for some people it can be.   I do think that in many ways he has done very much good, and I have no way of knowing how much that his disregard for concupiscience may have caused damage to those misled by it.  I do hope that he will take the public criticism to heart and find someone who can help him to correct his misinterpretations.  Our culture needs it and so does the Church.

Now it is not clear from the report what this support group will entail.  They interview the Paulist priest who will be leading the group, Fr. Ed Koharchik, who provides some interesting statements as reported by UT’s student newspaper, The Daily Texan:

“We want to provide a safe place for young people to talk about this issue – how does it fit in with the Catholic Church teachings?” said the Rev. Ed Koharchik, associate director at the center. “Whether one is gay or straight, it’s morally neutral.”

In recent weeks, the center has promoted the support group, whose purpose is to shed light on the “misconstrued teachings of the church” with respect to non-heterosexual lifestyles, Koharchik said.

“It’s about this group of people and how to stay within the teachings of the church and yet still identify as being of that orientation,” said Michael Jungwirth, a Middle Eastern studies graduate student. “It sounds reasonable.”

Now what he means by “morally neutral” I suppose depends upon what he means by being “gay or straight.”  Unfortunately, using those terms succumbs  to the mistaken notion that same sex attraction has some ontological basis rather than being a disorder that requires healing.  Fr. Koharchik seems to recognize that the terms refer first to a life style.  In other words, they are forms of behavior.

The comments from the student sound promising I suppose.  It is important to stay within the teachings of the Church.  However, I am not all that confident about Fr. Koharchik’s understanding of Church teaching if some of his interviews have been correctly reported.  For example, in an interview with the Daily Texan, published by Politico before the election he is said to have claimed that social issues like immigration and the death penalty were just as important as abortion…Catholics are not single issue voters.  Some additional comments:

Koharchik said he hopes to deter Catholics from breaking off their relationship with God due to their sexual orientation. He said he wants community members to know that sexuality is not tied to an individual’s personhood and that linking the two together could “cut off awareness to goodness.”

Now this is a troubling, deficient anthropology.  If he said this, he really should learn John Paul II’s theology of the body.  In fact, one’s sex is constitutive, in part, of personhood.  One is male or female and cannot be a human person without being so.  Sex difference establishes the structure by which the individual person exercises his personhood.  The claim attributed to Fr. Koharchik introduces a dualism into the person not unrelated to the body-soul dualism of our post-Cartesian Western culture (often mistakenly attributed to Platonism some would argue).  Teaching young people who are confused about their sexual identity because of some pathology that their sexual identity is not part of who they are as persons is not the solution.  In fact, they will recognize that this is false.

Rather, one needs to help them better understand how in fact their intuition that their sex is an integral aspect them as persons, is in fact valid.  The fact that they suffer from an interior conflict between who they are and how they feel is something they do need to understand.  Otherwise, I do not see how they will ever be able to understand why the Church teaches as She does, that they cannot act on certain inclinations.  If they are given to think that this great drive in their lives is something completely unrelated to them as persons and so acting upon it is sinful then this will appear to be an arbitrary, unfair, and impossible demand…something they already, no doubt, feel.

I am further discouraged by the resource that they have chosen as their guide; the problematic, notorious document released by the NCCB a few years back:

Among other pastoral recommendations aimed toward church ministers, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops suggests in its pamphlet, “Always Our Children,” that religious entities “help to establish or promote support groups for parents and family members” of gays and lesbians.

This document had the overall affect of saying “yes you are gay but you ought not to act upon it.”  A ridiculous proposition from any perspective.  I do hope that the following authentically expresses the teachings of the Church

Koharchik’s goal for the support group is to encourage a chaste lifestyle for every person and to encourage members to “live morally good and make proper decisions.

If the way Fr. Koharchik has been represented in the Daily Texan is an accurate portrayal of his thinking, I am concerned that his group will foster more hurt and confusion among those already suffering from such a difficult disorder that attacks the very center of one’s personal identity.  I recognize that it is possible that they are using terminology that they consider pastorally necessary (the fact that they seem to have asked for the Austin Diocese’s support might support this possibility) but it is also possible that they are getting into something that they are not qualified to do.  I would have to ask why they would not draw upon an already existing and successful program like Courage rather than going it alone with an approach that, as the reporting suggests, is in danger of bearing doing more harm than good.

Donna Freitas, a Catholic theologian and Assistant Professor of Religion at Boston University, recently published a book on attitudes toward sex among contemporary students at colleges and universities, Catholic and otherwise: Sex & the Soul: Juggling Sexuality, Spirituality, Romance, and Religion on America’s College Campuses.

She found that Catholic college and university students are as prone to contemporary “hook-up” culture as students at secular universities. She found that only strongly evangelical colleges comprise student bodies that reject the hook-up culture: because, she says, in the manner of a liberal protestant, these evangelical colleges encourage a “cult of purity.”

Freitas is apparently not a profound theologian. You can read a little bit about her book and her general take on things at National Catholic Reporter and decide for yourself. Nevertheless, it is useful to learn from her that students at Catholic colleges are as prone as any to engage in thematic “sex parties.” One particularly prevalent type of sex party, Freitas shows, involves young women dressing up as sexual objects (prostitutes, etc.) and engaging in random fornication with their male hosts.

Freitas gives us useful, though somewhat abstract, sociological information in this book. But the whole sordid trend becomes personally shocking when one hears a first-hand account of such a party.

We at C-L-S have been apprised of such an incident. It happened recently off campus at a prominent Catholic university, and involved undergraduate students from the university in a swingers’ game that was prominent in the 1970s. We cannot, of course, give the identity of the person who was brought, unwittingly, to the party and who told us about it. Nor can we disclose the particular university. The student in question left the party, appalled, as soon as it became evident what was going on.

There are many shocking things about all of this. But what is most shocking of all, in our opinion, is the resigned attitude that women who willingly partake in these sordid activities have about them.

We have recently posted on a study revealing the grim fruits of Catholic higher education.  The study indicated that half of the students in Catholic colleges and universities think that it is morally permissible to fornicate.  Most surprisingly, the study revealed that women were more likely (50%) than men (41%) to engage in premarital sex. Troubling as these numbers are, they do not prepare one for arrival of 1970′s swingers’ games that for some, or even many, appear to be what college is all about.

John Paul II was often accused of paying so much attention to women that he virtually ignored men in his theo-pastoral writings. He did, in fact, directly address women much more than men.  He did so because he recognized that a great evil had entered the culture, one that was directly attacking femininity.

What John Paul saw was that modern feminism had adopted Margaret Sanger’s distorted viewpoint that for women to be equal to men they must be able to compete with men in everything.  At the forefront of Sanger’s concern was the ability to be “equal” with men in hedonistic, sexual debauchery, which demands that women be free not simply from any procreative ramifications of unrestrained sex, but even free from any emotional attachments arising from sexual intercourse. Science was to help in the former, but not the latter.

Men and women are both created for complementary, total self-giving.  Sexual intercourse is the most intimate manner of total self-gift, but sex has an immutable, inner structure.  The complementarity of sex is not purely physical.  The natural telos of this physical complementarity points to a greater meaning. Fruitful sexual intercourse results in the unity of persons and, simultaneously, the openness to life-giving love.  This physical structure suggests a metaphysical structure to complementary love.  Namely, masculine love is one of initiating love, and feminine love is actively receptive.

As such, both men and women in their entire make up, physiological, emotional, psychological, and spiritual, are ordered according to this structure of love.  This makeup orients women more toward relationships and, in terms of the sexual act, to experiencing it as the permanent bonding themselves with another person.  Karol Wojtyla indicates this in his book, Love and Responsibility:

The very structure of the male psyche and personality is such that it is more readily “compelled” to disclose and objectivize the hidden significance of love for a person of the other sex. This goes with the relatively more active role of the male in such love, and also imposes a responsibility on him. Whereas in the woman sensuality is as it were covert, and concealed by sentimentality. For this reason she is by nature, more inclined to go on seeing as a manifestation of affection what a man already clearly realizes to be the effect of sensuality and the desire for enjoyment. There exists then, as we see, a certain psychological divergence between man and woman in the manner of their participation in love. The woman appears more passive, although in a different way she is more active. In any case, her role and her responsibility will be different from the role and responsibility of the male (Karol Wojtya, Love and Responsibility, [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993] 111-12).

The context of this statement is sexual intercourse. It is so very important, especially for girls and young women, to understand the differences between the meaning which men and women generally attach to the sexual experience. Because of their masculine structure, which is less integrated than women, men generally experience it more in terms of sensuality and enjoyment. Women, on the other hand, because they are more interior and integrated, will see and experience it more in the way of affection and attachment. That is not to say that men and women are not both damaged when this structure is violated.  They are, but in different ways.  Men, in general, experience the inability to form lasting relationships when they regularly fornicate.  Women generally experience emotional trauma.

The resignation of the young women at college sex parties shows that they are getting the message that they should be talking and thinking about sex in a manner more in keeping with fallen masculine habits.  Nevertheless, they still will experience sex as feminine persons. Due to their feminine structure, they generally should be more reticent about engaging in sex outside of wedlock, but in their confusion they are setting themselves, and the rest of society, on a collision course with reality.  They do not experience pre-marital sex in the same way they are told about it and talk about it. We suspect that the epidemic of cutting, anorexia/bulimia, and other psychological ailments that all too many young women are experiencing is due in large part to this confusion. The sage wisdom that says: God forgives always, men sometimes, but nature never, applies here. With religious restraint on social debauchery all but gone, and feminine restraint waning, there is little to prevent the cultural collapse that all societies face when they so reject the order of nature.

If we had a child ready to go to college, we would seriously consider delaying his entrance until we were morally certain that he had the spiritual maturity to weather the storm of hedonism that he will confront during his four years at what appear to have become fornication factories. Certainly this is not the case at every Catholic school, but only at those which take their Catholic identity seriously will there be a likelihood that the experiences of the young student that we mentioned at the beginning of this post will be avoided. Saint Maria Goretti and Blessed Pier Giorgio Frassatti, pray for us!

I had mentioned that Loughlin cannot seem to get beyond his reductionist, postmodern concepts. Furthermore, his importation of a world view from morally bankrupt postmodern thinker, Georges Bataille, further exacerbates his ability to understand, and so critique, the Trinitarian theology and anthropology of Hans Urs von Balthasar. In Loughlin’s defense, while Balthasar is dependent upon an Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysics, he is often loathe to acknowledge it. Without recognizing this metaphysical perspective in Balthasar’s thought, his theology can appear to be somewhat arbitrary. Loughlin’s apparent lack of understanding of this metaphysical tradition might contribute to his misreading of Balthasar.

Recall that Loughlin chose to replace theological analogy with a postmodern “parody,” with all of the latter’s attendant vulgarity. Loughlin seems to make the same amoral move with his understanding of eros, blundering into the same irony. Loughlin’s definition of eros is “ravenous desire” (p. 148). Eros for him, as we saw in the previous post, seems solely associated with animalistic desire. It is of interest to note that the meaning of the term ravenous is focused on taking something for oneself in a greedy way, quite antithetical to Balthasar’s anthropology, which requires disinterested and total self-gift as the foundation for an authentic eros. Etymologically, the term “ravenous” arises from the Old French word meaning “to seize,” itself coming from a word meaning “extremely hungry.” This is consistent with Loughlin’s adoption of Batailleian carnal vulgarity.

Loughlin seems to have in his mind when he talks about sex difference that a constitutive aspect of sex must include the various disordered sexual behaviors in which animalistic consumption masquerades as sexual intercourses’ proper telos, a communion of persons.

Loughlin’s obsession with corporal sex betrays an inability to understand the human person as a body-soul unity, a hylomorphic composite of body and soul in which the soul is not joined to a preexisting body, but the soul interpenetrates, gives existence, shape, and animation to the body. The human person is not, therefore, an enfleshed soul or an ensouled body, but a single nature that has two unified aspects, body and a spiritual soul.

Loughlin also seems not to understand the tradition of Trinitarian Persons as subsisting Relations, which distinguish the Persons from the one divine nature and the way that this is analogically manifested in the human person. The category of relation, a sort of quasi-substantial category, is essential to understanding how Balthasar and other personalists think about the human person and the way the human person is differentiated into two different sexes.

Loughlin seems only to be able to think in terms of Cartesian substance, which is simply matter, or – in the case of the human body – corporeality. For non-corporeal beings it is not as clear what his thinking is, but it does not include the category of relation. Thus, when Loughlin reads Balthasar writing of the Processions (the begetting of the Son and the Spiration of the Holy Spirit) in terms of the structure of Self-giving love, he sees this in terms of the movement of some substance from one Person to another. Human persons inevitably “parody” this postmodern monism in Loughlin’s anthropology.

Thus, Loughlin criticizes Balthasar’s concept of unity in difference. For Balthasar the unity in difference, which can be seen in creation (body and soul, individual and community, the Incarnation, male and female), is the created analogy of trinitarian unity (unity in nature and distinction in Persons). Loughlin does not appear to understand relation so he ends up collapsing every characteristic into some sort of substance (read as Cartesian extension).

Without a properly Trinitarian metaphysics, Louglin is unequipped to understand the Processions, the Incarnation, the Church, the Eucharist, or sex difference. It leads him to claim that his “parodic substitution allows Christianity to place at its symbolic centre certain cultural taboos-against cannibalism, incest and homosexuality-and there break them” (p. 152). Loughlin sees the Processions as “the incestuous homosexual coupling of Father and Son” (p. 156). Of course, the Eucharist is cannibalism. The Marian Church wedded to Christ the Bridegroom is incestuous.

Ironically, Loughlin accuses Balthasar of misreading “the flow of the trinitarian parodies” (p. 154) when the latter declares that humanity is primarily feminine. Loughlin claims that Balthasar’s own logic requires human nature to be masculine. His reasoning is that because Balthasar says that the Father is supramasculine in relation to the Son, and because the Church comes through Christ on the Cross, who is male, and that Eve comes from Adam’s flesh, which is male flesh, there is a masculine sexual monism that is later differentiated into male and female.

Loughlin clearly sees matter as the primary reality here, at least for creatures. Substance for him is extended matter. In fact, he does not seem to have any other category. Sex difference for him is real, and so in his limited, modern/post-modern categories, sex difference must be something arising from the flesh alone. This is inevitable without the category of relation, especially in this case, sex difference being a relational category which conditions the relational person (see this metathread for a short primer on these ideas).

Loughlin is not the only RO theologian with these views. Rowan Williams promotes similar thinking in his essay, “The Body’s Grace.” This essay was published in a collection of pro-SSAD articles entitled, Christian Our Selves, Our Souls and Bodies: Sexuality and the Household of God [ed. Charles C. Hefling (Boston: Cowley Press, 1996)]. Hankey (see the previous post) shows that Williams was an original member of the Radical Orthodoxy movement. Hierothee pointed me to a recent article online that shows that Williams’s unfortunately soft thinking in this regard is not at all unlike that of Loughlin.

In conclusion, I would note that it appears to be not so much that Louglin’s and Williams’s distortions/perversions of Christian truth stem from a misunderstanding of classical theology. Rather, the problem begins with their pre-commitment to said perverted notions. Their articulation of an incoherent metaphysics is simply a rationalization for a subversively depraved anthropology. Indeed, with the likes of Loughlin and Williams as guides to the movement, one might argue that Radical Orthodoxy is at root an expression of radical depravity.

One such RO author is Gerard Loughlin. Loughlin writes a chapter in a volume edited by John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, entitled Radical Orthodoxy. The volume is meant to be a representative summary of Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward’s school of thought. Thus, it would seem, that Loughlin’s essay is representative of RO’s anthropology. Loughlin’s article is entitled: “Erotics: God’s Sex.”

Loughlin uses Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theological articulation of the analogy between Trinitarian Processions and the marital sexual act as his foil, primarily using the second volume from Balthasar’s Theodrama. Loughlin wishes to critique Balthasar (and by explicit implication, John Paul II’s Theology of the Body) by privileging the insights of none other than the French pervert postmodern essayist/philosopher Georges Bataille, who obviously was a bit sick, having volunteered to be a human sacrifice for a group of his friends. Bataille apparently never saw a Rorschach chart that he couldn’t find obscene, finding the mechanical aspects of sexual copulation in almost everything he saw. Bataille’s pornographic milieu, then, is Loughlin’s point of departure for evaluating Balthasar’s analogy.

The main thing he takes from Bataille, perhaps aside from his pornographic obsession, is his attachment to the postmodern literary parody. Loughlin decides that he wants to substitute parody for the theological concept of analogy because it entails the burlesque which “couples [Loughlin is clearly enthralled with the "parody" of this grammatic/logical phrase and the sexual-mechanical inference] the polite with the vulgar, the metaphysical with the indecent” (italics mine, p. 145). To replace parody with analogy simply illustrates either ignorance of the metaphysical foundation upon which analogy stands or an irresponsible disregard for analogy’s metaphysical implications. Wayne Hankey’s insights suggest to me that it may be both.

Loughlin, though a Cambridge scholar, who, I understand, claims to be Catholic, does not seem to have a solid grasp of the Catholic tradition in terms of metaphysics or theological anthropology. He very often appears unable to extract himself from his postmodern categories, which, after all, are ironcially modern distortions that are simply taken in a different direction. This leads him often to accuse his foils of the very faults he himself possesses. For example, he finds that Balthasar falls into a crude biologism (see p. 158). This charge comes from his apparent inability to distinguish between relational and substantial categories.

Perhaps his critique of Sister Mary Timothy Prokes treatment of human sexuality might be sufficient to illustrate what I mean. He says:

Prokes, who with Balthasar, is surely correct in stressing the intimacy of persons in the sexual relation, is nevertheless so concerned to distance human sexuality from the animalistic-from the itch and yearning of sexual organs-that one might think the attraction and desirability of the body-its physical comforts and excitements-had nothing to do with human sexuality. Prokes offers a peculiarly passionless, unsexy, sexuality. In short, she fails to think the erotic (p. 148).

This quotation, it seems to me, is quite revealing. Loughlin seems to want to equate the “animalistic” with eros. He appears to say that without this animalistic “itch and yearning” one cannot have eros. In other words, like many who promote libidinism (a sexual ethic which elevates pleasure to an end rather than accepting it as a secondary, non-essential fruit of the sexual act), he either does not understand or rejects classical Christian anthropology.

The human affects (appetites, emotions, etc.) are good, but they serve primarily the animal aspects of the human person. But man is a hylomorph; he is a body-soul unity and the soul has priority, though this does not diminish the essential (in a metaphysical sense) importance of the body. The functioning of the affects becomes an issue in our fallen state.

Human nature was created for grace. We do not require grace in order to be human, but we do require it in order to function integrally. Our human affects were created to be subordinated to human reason, but our loss of original integrity makes this subordination a challenge and a task. The tradition calls this challenge concupiscence. Too often, post-moderns (or better, late-moderns) emphasize human experience but they refuse or at least neglect to contextualize this experience as fallen. Truth be told, they want to make even their fallen experiences normative.

Loughlin seems to fall into this trap. He appears to want to make his experiences paradigmatic. Thus, he conflates the animal aspect of his experiences with the fallen animalism to which he apparently succumbs. He does not see that eros and the erotic must be purified from concupiscence. Nor does he desire to subordinate sexual urges (which in his thought include the unnatural) to reason. This he finds to be “passionless, unsexy, sexuality.”

Interestingly enough, this leads him in the complete opposite direction of the communion for which the personalistic end of the sexual act tends. In fact, Loughlin, clearly, has chosen his terms wisely. For the sexual act outside of the Church’s understanding of sexual intercourse is a parody, a mocking of its intended personalistic and natural ends-communion and procreation, respectively. These ends correspond to the hylomorphic aspects of the human person. When one severs the unitive from the procreative, one gets neither. We are left with what is authentically animalistic and contra-personal.

Sub-personal animals also reflect divine perfection, but in a lesser way than humans. Like their human counterparts, sub-personal animals also seek a sort of communion. However, without a spiritual soul, this communion is reduced to consumption. It is manifested in eating, in which the animal annihilates an often lower nature and takes it up into its higher nature. It is joined to the other but in the antithesis of personal communion. Instead of self-giving/self-sacrifice, it is the other that is taken/sacrificed. Perhaps this insight can explain why we speak of “comfort foods,” which we seem drawn to, especially when we have relational problems.

The eroticism that Loughlin seems to seek is this mocking parody of authentic, sexy, sexuality. His is the desire to follow his animal inclinations, to reject human reason, and to pursue a fallen, and in his case unnatural, communion with another. Thus he advocates the consumption of another soul for the sake of his pleasure-”the itch and yearning of [his] sexual organs.” Is it any wonder that unnatural sexual acts are “parodies” of eating?

There is much more that can and will be said about Loughlin’s article but this will have to do for now. If he is indeed representative of “Radical Orthodoxy,” then theirs is a most unorthodox and vulgar orthodoxy.

I suppose that the title of the page, Christians Do It Better, should have been some indication of the thinking of the site’s originators. Given that it was for a dating service, perhaps I should have expected some of what I was to see. A good portion of the listings are what one might expect from a Christian site. However, that is not entirely the case.

There are at least two headings which are largely problematic. Under the Sex section you will find such fare as pornography free sexual positions guides for “Christians”, a blog about a bisexual “Christian” who enjoys open sexual relationships, and “Christian” guides to sexual identity. There is also a “Gay” section which lists a number of websites by self identified Christians who embrace the lifestyle associated with same sex attraction disorder.  I am not sure many of these folks would be comfortable being included in the same category as our blog.

One might say that for a large portion of the entries, this site is not about Christian relationships but a summary of the gamut of relationships engaged in among those who call themselves Christian. This site perhaps is emblematic of the natural conclusion of a Protestant mentality. What I mean is a world view which rejects all moral authority but one’s own. As this coincided with Hierothee’s reminding me about an article that I need to write, I thought I would jot a few quick thoughts on the matter. That will come in a future post.  In the meantime, perhaps we might contemplate the thinking that lies behind a Christian’s coopting the quite pagan claim that they do “it” better.

But Wolfe, who is generally more prescient regarding the culture than those purely literary types who review his books, was simply expressing a sense of a connection that honest philosophers since the time of Socrates have recognized as their vocation to articulate. Namely, it is impossible that there should be such a thing as objective moral goodness if reality is nothing more than matter in motion.

Philosophical materialism is the underlying metaphysical presupposition of the contemporary academy. It is a metaphysical position that is thought, by many, to have been put on an unshakable foundation by the findings of modern neuroscience. All experiences and thoughts are capable of being measured in the brain, so it is said by materialists, and we have proven this by our successes in mapping experiences and thoughts to their neural correlates. Certain neural regions, when stimulated, give rise to experiences and thoughts. Many take this to mean that the brain must be wholly causal of psychological phenomena, and this is taken to mean, at least implicitly, that the human person is reducible to his brain. We truly are (on this view), to borrow an image from Descartes, brains in a vat, though the vat in question is simply the rest of the human body. Much of the effort in neuroscience is directed to finding the neural correlates of psychic experience.

Perhaps the best book written on the subject of the relationship of the mind and the brain remains Stanley Jaki’s Brain, Mind and Computers. The book was originally published in 1969, with a second and expanded edition in 1989. Jaki, as many may know, is a Catholic priest, theologian, and perhaps the most important historian and philosopher of science in the past 40 years. In this book, he defends the existence of the soul, whose existence alone, he argues, makes human understanding possible. He makes this defense, in a masterful blend of historical scholarship and philosophical argumentation, against the reigning philosophies that underlie modern neuroscience and especially against those who think that mental processes are reducible to computer models. Jaki considers the relationship of the brain to experience and thought, and he levels a devastating critique of those who champion the existence of “artificial intelligence,” those, that is, who equate understanding with the physical manipulation by pre-established rules of purely formal systems. Especially valuable is chapter V of the book, which Jaki added to the second edition and which gives a very suggestive phenomenology of language.

The book is worth considering in detail, but there is one point that Jaki makes near the end of it that I wish to bring out here, and that gets me to the point of this post. Jaki gives several suggestions, toward the end of chapter 5, for defenders of the existence of the soul to consider in regard to the contemporary debate on the mind and the brain, inasmuch as there is such a debate. One of his suggestions is that defenders of the soul should have the courage to call a spade a spade. By this he means that philosophers who recognize fully the dignity of the human person must be brave enough to stand athwart efforts by neuroscientists, sociobiologists, proponents of artificial intelligence, and the like, to reshape human society according to their valueless science. Jaki explains:

… [society] merrily marches down the road to anarchy. The march is to the brass bands composed of academics who have been busy trumpeting that exclusive attention to quanitatively specificable patterns is the only posture with intellectual respectability. Such a pattern is on hand whenever a behavior, no matter how queer, is acted upon in a statistically significant number. From there it is but a short step to claims to legal recognition and protection, as on the basis of mere patterns, so many pure formalizations, everything becomes a mere machinery, with no allowance for distinctions between the morally good and the morally evil. Hence the steady erosion of sensitivity for hallowed principles, as if they were so many words, and the growing readiness to grant social respectability to any behavior, provided it establishes itself as a pattern. (Brain, Mind and Computers p. 295)

Jaki wrote these words in 1989, and there is little doubt that he did not have the concept of “gay marriage” on his mind at that time. But the basic principle that he brings out here is at play in the ever-greater social acceptance of “gay marriage.”

What he means in this passage is that there are those who hold that behavior is entirely determined by biology. The biological dimension of beings is, in turn, thought to be capable of being mathematically measured. Indeed, the establishment of a mathematical measure to things is the ultimate goal of science. The ultimate reality of things is, on the view of many, that which is quantifiable. Given the advances of twentieth century physics, mathematical science has tended to rest in statistical analysis, especially so in regard to “biological systems.” The statistical is therefore thought to be the real. Statistical significance is the only significance. There is no good or bad, in the traditional moral sense. There are only, for these reductionists, statistically significant occurrences of behavior.

Jaki confines his attention to unmasking the pretensions of proponents of artificial intelligence. They think only in terms of statistical significance. They have no other basis then statistical analysis to uphold or deny moral norms. But, going beyond Jaki’s analysis, it must be recognized that the philosophical position of these reductionists goes hand-in-glove with utilitarianism, which reduces the rational assessment of human action to a calculus of pleasure.

The upshot of this type of moral reasoning is that there can be no standard of moral goodness that transcends comfort and demographic consensus. If a person’s behavior is thought to contribute to his comfort and pleasure then his behavior is acceptable, on the condition that the statistically-verified, consensus opinion of his society is amenable to his behavior.

Of course, this type of reasoning goes against the virtue ethic of the Catholic tradition, for which actions or behaviors are good or bad by their very nature. In regard to the discussion of “gay marriage,” the gap between the Church’s virtue ethic and the materialistic ethos of the wider culture makes it very difficult at present for genuinely Catholic opinion to penetrate public opinion. On the analysis of the Church, it is in the nature of things that male and female are sexually oriented to one another, as is evidenced by their bodily complementarity. It is for the ultimate good of a society that it should encourage a stable ordering of this orientation of one to the other in the socially privileged institution of monogamous marriage.

Scriptural revelation unveils the profoundest depths of the ordering of male and female to one another. Marriage is revealed in scripture in its sacramental profundity. The union of man and woman in the Church, as Saint Paul realized, gives to marriage its full significance as both sign and instantiation of the entire Church’s nuptial relationship to Christ the Bridegroom. Naturally, the Church cannot force civil society to accept the sacramental meaning of marriage. But the revealed meaning of marriage is a perfection of its natural meaning, and it is the Church’s duty to defend this natural meaning even in the civil order.

Ultimately, mind-brain reductionism devalues the body as much as it denies the existence of the mind. The form of the body is of little consequence to an analysis of human action for reductionists. For the virtue ethic of the Church, the sexual act is good inasmuch as it is ordered to the union of husband and wife and the openness to procreation that seals their love most fully. The form of the body and the experience of married love reveal to natural experience the soundness of this teaching. But reductionists cannot see in the form of the body anything that is of its essence, just as they cannot see in concrete experience anything that connects to reality. Male, female, or some combination of the two: it makes no difference. Matter and its statistically analyzed motion is the only reality for reductionists, not the “shape” of the body, not its concrete existence as we experience it. Reality, for reductionists, is ultimately a homogeneous mass of matter/energy in space-time. The things we experience in our everyday life, the basis for the Church’s virtue ethic, are denied reality.

So, the upshot of the cultural dominance of mind-brain reductionism, as Tom Wolfe realized, is the situation of poor Charlotte Simmons, an innocent college co-ed at a prestigious university, who is left to figure out her life in an environment where anything goes. What difference does it make, as long as almost everyone is comfortable and having a good time? In the end, you are only your brain. When it dies, there is nothing left. Why, then, should we not have a culture formed by the ethos of “Girls Gone Wild,” or “Boys Gone Wild,” or “The Jerry Springer Show?”

How do we, as faithful and hopeful Catholics, transform this cultural situation? It can only come through the Church. As the Holy Father himself realizes, it starts with the reform of the Church’s liturgy, where bodily form and symbol have to be valued once again after several decades of anti-religious leveling of the symbols in the Church. And Catholic institutions of higher education have to have the boldness, as Fr. Jaki says, to call a spade a spade. Moral reasoning is impotent if it is based upon the idea that the mind is reducible to the brain. The Church’s intellectual class needs to state it plainly: there can be no such a thing as objective goodness or of “values” that transcend cultural norms if the mind is reducible to the brain. Luckily, we are seeing more and more bishops who are stating the matter plainly, and we must all support them.

A careful reading of Catholic philosophers and theologians in the Thomist tradition, such as Stanly Jaki, has much to teach us as well, and Catholic universities should get back to this tradition of thought. A first pedagogical step would be to teach a sound epistemology to students: one that recognizes that each and every act of understanding transcends the material domain. The brain cannot understand. Computers cannot understand. These cannot understand because material systems cannot, as Thomists have always understood, abstract universals from concrete particulars. And it is only by abstracting the universal meaning of things that any particular thing – whether it be a word, or a symbol, or an animal, or a tree, or a molecule – is understood. Brains and computers are only concrete particulars, or collects of concrete particulars, and only act within the concrete moment. They cannot transcend the concrete moment of space-time because they exist entirely within it. It takes spirit, which is not confined to space-time, in order to abstract the universal from the concrete. It takes spirit in order to understand, for instance, what it means to be a person, or to be this particular person, or to understand any particular thing or general concept that persons communicate. Of course, I mean by spirit, at least for humans as opposed to angels and God, that which is, in the soul, truly united to the body (as the soul was not for Descartes), even though the soul is not reducible to the body. This sound epistemology, which is also the only basis for a sound ontology, is the starting point for a genuinely Catholic and Christian educational perspective. It should be expanded and brought out on many different levels. It is the basis of true philosophy and theology. It is only in recognizing the existence of the soul and the body (both of which are done away with by mind-body reductionism), and their unity, that a truly humanistic form of moral reasoning can be articulated.

Despite the cancellation, students helped organize a speech of John Corvino off campus.

“Gay and lesbian relationships make some people happy. And I don’t just mean that they make people feel good. They are an important avenue of meaning and fulfillment in people’s lives,” said Corvino, who teaches at Wayne State University. “If we’re going to deny that experience to an entire group of people, we better have a darned good reason.”

“The way gay and lesbian people are treated in our society is morally wrong. I’m asking people to make moral judgments not on whom they love, but on whether they love.”

“Some people refer to me as a fallen Catholic. I didn’t fall. I leapt. We should not confuse complete faith in God with complete faith in our ability to discern God’s voice.”

“Of course two men can’t make a baby. But is making babies the only legitimate reason for having sex?”

“The usual response to a gay person is not ‘Hey, no fair. How come he gets to be gay and I don’t?’ We can continue to support (heterosexual marriage) while recognizing that it’s not right for everyone.”

For as long as one pursues this type of self-gratifying sexuality which is based on the desire to “love” and to be “loved” on one’s own terms, the more his psychological & spiritual health suffers up to the point of corruptness and spiritual death. Because sexuality forms an integral part of our personality, it makes sense to those who suffer from a wounded sense of sexual identity to believe sexual orientation is tied to something significantly more than the sexual act; consequently; love and acceptance becomes something that must be earned by the other but is a conditional entitlement or right which must be afforded to the self.

“I will lead you into the desert that I may speak to your heart…” (Hos 2:16)

“My grace is sufficient for you, for in weakness, power reaches perfection” (2 Cor 12:9)

“How does it feel to be a pregnant man?”(link to “gay” news website - Advocate) Thomas writes in the article. “Incredible. Despite the fact that my belly is growing with a new life inside me, I am stable and confident being the man that I am. In a technical sense I see myself as my own surrogate, though my gender identity as male is constant. To Nancy, I am her husband carrying our child . . . I will be my daughter’s father, and Nancy will be her mother. We will be a family.”

The fantasy of changing one’s personal meaning by changing one’s gender is derived from the fallacious belief that sexuality somehow frees us from our bondage to fear, inadequacies and despair. There is the tendency among many of us to cling to what can be lost or taken away, but there are those among us who invest their total being into these fears to the point where there can be no rest or satisfaction of ever receiving enough in return. To carry the burden of an external locus of control, one lives life with the constant feelings of being controlled by the actions of others and blown about by the whims of the world – being terrified of the bitter taste of losing or being denied of whatever is held in high value to them, some to the point of life itself.

Gender roles and identities are ultimately formed through the individual mind as experienced within the world which immediately surrounds us; consequently, some of us fail to recognize the potential fraud of assuming an identity in the first place. Constrained by deep insecurities and fears through reacting against the reality of one’s own sexual identity, some cling to a fantasy of there being something “wrong” with the external body vs. something being “wrong” internally, within the heart and mind. Simply speaking, Gender Identity Disorder is more of a rejection and abandonment of who one is, than the adoption of who and what one desires to be.

“Be not afraid,” because “each of us is the result of a thought of God, each of us is willed, each of us is loved, each of us is necessary”. – Pope Benedict XVI

“We regret any confusion that may have come from this situation. We want this patient and her physician to know that they are welcome at Seton Medical Center.”

In doing so they not only have caved into the pressure but they also have abetted this suffering soul’s confusion by referring to him as a woman and seeming to imply that they were wrong to have refused the mutilating procedure (aka breast enhancement operation) in the first place.

Any way, it turns out that the man, “Charlene” Hastings will not have his mutilation done at the Catholic hospital, Seton Medical Center, because he would feel that the hospital “is doing it under duress.” Nevertheless, he is going forward with the civil suit for monetary damages according to his lawyer. That is a surprise.

The local CBS TV news station reports that “transgender Charlene Hastings has claimed moral victory against Catholics.” That after all is what “Charlene” is really after.  I suspect that even in his confusion he still senses that his interior conflict is not the fact that he is a woman in a man’s body but that he is in fact really a man who cannot come to terms with his sexual identity. Thus, he needs continual reaffirmation that he is correct in his desire to reconcile this conflict by mutilating his body such that it makes him look like he feels. Of course, the lawyer’s goal is just as pathological but has nothing to do with moral victories. Nevertheless, perhaps in order to satisfy his victim’s, errr, client’s need for affirmation, he provides the following:

The CBS 5 News station characterized the statement as a “veiled apology.” It said, “transgender Charlene Hastings has claimed moral victory against Catholics.” According to the California Catholic Daily, Hasting’s attorney, Chris Dolan, said that a lawsuit seeking monetary damages would proceed.

“Like any good religious experience, first you need enlightenment and then you need atonement,” said Dolan. “And what we have here perhaps is a glimpse of enlightenment. Has it changed their heart? I don’t think so. Will it change their practice? It better.”

Isaiah 5:20, from the book of judgment, comes to mind here: “Woe to those who call evil good and good evil, who put darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter!” Dolan is right about Christian experience, though he forgets about repentance–not a surprise. However, to call what the hospital has “seen” as enlightenment is chillingly satanic. To trade the truth for an attempt at monetary preservation is exactly the opposite.  At best one can call their caving in, material cooperation with evil. If they did release the attributed statement, it becomes more likely formal cooperation with evil which a Catholic can never do, even if it means closing the doors of the hospital.

I hope that Dolan is right that those running the hospital’s hearts have not changed. It is the only chance that they will come to see that giving in to this coercion is harmful to those like “Charlene”, his lawyer, and in the long run to the hospital itself and larger society. If they were to act according to the truth, perhaps through their witness then those who authentically need it may eventually receive “enlightenment and then atonement.”