Cosmos-Liturgy-Sex

In a recent thread, a discussion about Radical Orthodoxy arose. In this discussion, Hierothee mentioned that at least some within the RO movement are able to advocate for unnatural sexual acts as theologically justified. RO arises out of the Protestant ethos and, even though they promote the importance of the authority of tradition, their Protestant ethos still imbues their thinking and so their rejection of the Christian anthropological tradition.

One such RO author is Gerard Loughlin. Loughlin writes a chapter in a volume edited by John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, entitled Radical Orthodoxy. The volume is meant to be a representative summary of Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward’s school of thought. Thus, it would seem, that Loughlin’s essay is representative of RO’s anthropology. Loughlin’s article is entitled: “Erotics: God’s Sex.”

Loughlin uses Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theological articulation of the analogy between Trinitarian Processions and the marital sexual act as his foil, primarily using the second volume from Balthasar’s Theodrama. Loughlin wishes to critique Balthasar (and by explicit implication, John Paul II’s Theology of the Body) by privileging the insights of none other than the French pervert postmodern essayist/philosopher Georges Bataille, who obviously was a bit sick, having volunteered to be a human sacrifice for a group of his friends. Bataille apparently never saw a Rorschach chart that he couldn’t find obscene, finding the mechanical aspects of sexual copulation in almost everything he saw. Bataille’s pornographic milieu, then, is Loughlin’s point of departure for evaluating Balthasar’s analogy.

The main thing he takes from Bataille, perhaps aside from his pornographic obsession, is his attachment to the postmodern literary parody. Loughlin decides that he wants to substitute parody for the theological concept of analogy because it entails the burlesque which “couples [Loughlin is clearly enthralled with the "parody" of this grammatic/logical phrase and the sexual-mechanical inference] the polite with the vulgar, the metaphysical with the indecent” (italics mine, p. 145). To replace parody with analogy simply illustrates either ignorance of the metaphysical foundation upon which analogy stands or an irresponsible disregard for analogy’s metaphysical implications. Wayne Hankey’s insights suggest to me that it may be both.

Loughlin, though a Cambridge scholar, who, I understand, claims to be Catholic, does not seem to have a solid grasp of the Catholic tradition in terms of metaphysics or theological anthropology. He very often appears unable to extract himself from his postmodern categories, which, after all, are ironcially modern distortions that are simply taken in a different direction. This leads him often to accuse his foils of the very faults he himself possesses. For example, he finds that Balthasar falls into a crude biologism (see p. 158). This charge comes from his apparent inability to distinguish between relational and substantial categories.

Perhaps his critique of Sister Mary Timothy Prokes treatment of human sexuality might be sufficient to illustrate what I mean. He says:

Prokes, who with Balthasar, is surely correct in stressing the intimacy of persons in the sexual relation, is nevertheless so concerned to distance human sexuality from the animalistic-from the itch and yearning of sexual organs-that one might think the attraction and desirability of the body-its physical comforts and excitements-had nothing to do with human sexuality. Prokes offers a peculiarly passionless, unsexy, sexuality. In short, she fails to think the erotic (p. 148).

This quotation, it seems to me, is quite revealing. Loughlin seems to want to equate the “animalistic” with eros. He appears to say that without this animalistic “itch and yearning” one cannot have eros. In other words, like many who promote libidinism (a sexual ethic which elevates pleasure to an end rather than accepting it as a secondary, non-essential fruit of the sexual act), he either does not understand or rejects classical Christian anthropology.

The human affects (appetites, emotions, etc.) are good, but they serve primarily the animal aspects of the human person. But man is a hylomorph; he is a body-soul unity and the soul has priority, though this does not diminish the essential (in a metaphysical sense) importance of the body. The functioning of the affects becomes an issue in our fallen state.

Human nature was created for grace. We do not require grace in order to be human, but we do require it in order to function integrally. Our human affects were created to be subordinated to human reason, but our loss of original integrity makes this subordination a challenge and a task. The tradition calls this challenge concupiscence. Too often, post-moderns (or better, late-moderns) emphasize human experience but they refuse or at least neglect to contextualize this experience as fallen. Truth be told, they want to make even their fallen experiences normative.

Loughlin seems to fall into this trap. He appears to want to make his experiences paradigmatic. Thus, he conflates the animal aspect of his experiences with the fallen animalism to which he apparently succumbs. He does not see that eros and the erotic must be purified from concupiscence. Nor does he desire to subordinate sexual urges (which in his thought include the unnatural) to reason. This he finds to be “passionless, unsexy, sexuality.”

Interestingly enough, this leads him in the complete opposite direction of the communion for which the personalistic end of the sexual act tends. In fact, Loughlin, clearly, has chosen his terms wisely. For the sexual act outside of the Church’s understanding of sexual intercourse is a parody, a mocking of its intended personalistic and natural ends-communion and procreation, respectively. These ends correspond to the hylomorphic aspects of the human person. When one severs the unitive from the procreative, one gets neither. We are left with what is authentically animalistic and contra-personal.

Sub-personal animals also reflect divine perfection, but in a lesser way than humans. Like their human counterparts, sub-personal animals also seek a sort of communion. However, without a spiritual soul, this communion is reduced to consumption. It is manifested in eating, in which the animal annihilates an often lower nature and takes it up into its higher nature. It is joined to the other but in the antithesis of personal communion. Instead of self-giving/self-sacrifice, it is the other that is taken/sacrificed. Perhaps this insight can explain why we speak of “comfort foods,” which we seem drawn to, especially when we have relational problems.

The eroticism that Loughlin seems to seek is this mocking parody of authentic, sexy, sexuality. His is the desire to follow his animal inclinations, to reject human reason, and to pursue a fallen, and in his case unnatural, communion with another. Thus he advocates the consumption of another soul for the sake of his pleasure-”the itch and yearning of [his] sexual organs.” Is it any wonder that unnatural sexual acts are “parodies” of eating?

There is much more that can and will be said about Loughlin’s article but this will have to do for now. If he is indeed representative of “Radical Orthodoxy,” then theirs is a most unorthodox and vulgar orthodoxy.