Intelligent Discussion of Intelligent Design: The Report
Last Tuesday night’s lecture/discussion on natural philosophy and intelligent design, that I had posted about a couple of weeks ago, was quite insightful. Below is my summary taken from the lecture, subsequent discussions with the speaker and others, and further personal cogitation.
Again, it was given by a PhD in experimental neurobiology, concentrating in the area of the genetics of behavior. In addition to his specialty in neurobiology, he also has a very solid academic background in classical philosophy and Catholic theology.
The first half of his lecture was aimed at putting the issue into context by explaining the classical understanding of science and natural philosophy, and how these relate to modern science. The speaker used a definition of modern science equivalent to what Aristotle termed techne (though he did not use techne, he later confirmed this in subsequent discussions). Aristotelian techne is the knowledge of particular instances applied for the purpose of modifying and controlling the world. For Aristotle techne is a partial knowledge. True knowledge comes from understanding the four causes (formal, final, material, and efficient).
The speaker described the classical view of knowlege, as that in which common sense experience is ultimately the method required in order to penetrate and understand the totality of being. It is ironic that today common sense experience is generally eschewed as a false sense of reality. Rather, we have a sort of gnostic perspective that holds that the ability to know the “really real” is limited to those of the knowledge class–the scientists. For example, we have those who assert that only those who have access to genetic information can really know the difference between a dog and a human being. This reductionist, in fact, bifurcated view of reality is really what turns out to be the crux of the Intelligent Design debate.
Modern science/techne, arising from the bifurcation of knowledge into the “subjective” (opinion) and “objective” (empirical fact) spheres, has limited itself to consideration of material and efficient causality. This turns out to be true to some extent, even for some who admit of aspects of formal and final causality–such as those who do admit of these as causes but deny them active principles. In the end this results in material and mechanistic presuppositions, even for those who philosophically reject materialism and mechanism. Ironically, the approach of Intelligent Design succumbs to the same reductionism as modern science. Both neo-Darwinists who deny design and ID folks who find it, in the end, have no room for (active) formal causality: neither are looking for a design but a Designer.
They both assume that there must be an efficient cause to account for the order that they see. The neo-Darwinist “philosophers” are looking for a secondary efficient cause and, finding none, they attribute order to the–now fairly widely acknowledged as failed–mechanisms of random genetic mutation and natural selection (which is random or not depending upon who you listen to and when they said it). ID also assumes that order requires an efficient cause and finding the natural, secondary efficient cause of neo-Darwinism wanting, suggests there must be some other efficient cause (though many creationists have opted to collapse the secondary efficient cause into the Primary Cause, which is the source of much of the heat in the debate).
The question arose, of course, whether ID is a science. Well, it is not pure techne (which, by the way, does not itself include mathematical models), but neither is most of what we call science. ID shares the same methodology of many disciplines which are considered science today: SETI, systems biology, and some aspects of anthropology. In fact, there are some fields accepted as science that make clearly “a-scientific” presuppositions, such as sociobiology which presupposes the selfishness of the organism (a moral presupposition!).
The question about falsification came up after the talk. It was pointed out that almost no philosophers of science hold this old Popperian theory any longer. It is held by some scientists, who play philosophers on television, and at least one jurist. There are problems with falsification. For example, some have shown that the theory of evolution itself cannot be falsified because it happens too slowly. Additionally, others have shown that one can falsify aspects of ID; in fact many scientists are trying to falsify claims of irreducible complexity. But the main reason falsification is meaningless is that while it appears to shut the front door on some issues, it really open the back door wide to many others, to include clearly pseudo-sciences as sciences, such as astrological claims which can be falsified.
However, the real question comes down to whether ID should be taught in schools. The answer is that what rather needs to be taught in schools is a systematic foundation in classical philosophy to include natural philosophy. ID, warts and all, could be taught here. Real gains need to be made to overcome the fragmentation in knowledge that makes us think that there is no interconnection between the knowledge of modern science and of philosophical speculation and common sense experience. The epistemological bifurcation which results in the prevailing scientism of our day is much more dangerous than ID. While the methods may vary somewhat, though there is much overlap, the scientism that supposes only modern science is authentic knowledge must be debunked. If the ID debate can be a catalyst in this direction then it will have served a good purpose.
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I have always said that, as a scientist, I would agree - modern science is not the “end-all” of pure knowledge. With modern science, all you can do is learn how things seem to work and then apply that information to predict and (ultimately) modify our environment. Many scientists out there make the mistake that if we know the DNA sequence of an organism, we have true *knowledge* of that organism and *know* everything about it. Essentially, they believe that from the genetic profile of a species, we could re-create that species. In reality, I know that if we know the DNA sequence, then we simply know that - the DNA sequence. We can *infer* other things (lots of other things) about the ramifications of this sequence on the organism, but there’s still more there to learn. Even in cloning - we use the correct DNA sequence maybe, but it’s left to nature (God?) to do most of the work. We don’t really *know* any more than how to make it work and approximately what will happen along points in time.
Interesting that you pointed out (well, the speaker pointed out, but same deal there) how both ID and science make the same mistake in this regard, which is (as I understood you) that they essentially both seem to believe that having knowledge of science is all you need to fully understand something. Too often, scientists do not understand what they are really learning!
Maybe this is why religion and science seem to always be at odds from each other, from the Age of Reason to the present. Science has become a pseudo-religion in some aspects. This is why it seems odd for scientists to be religious (most are not outwardly so), since this would be akin to someone being Catholic *AND* Muslim. I do wish that science would get back to its roots - namely the inquisitive nature humans possess and our unavoidable trend to want to use the laws that govern our universe to “mess with it” (scientists are really just playing with nature).
Now, should ID be taught in schools? Well, I’m still not convinced on that one. Let me make it clear, I’m not against ID theory in science classes altogether, but I do not see a reason to invoke a theory that really hasn’t had a chance to test itself in the scientific arena. If ID is really science, then let it grow on its own within the scientific community and let its theories be tested (or not?). I would *positively insist* however, to teach the fact that evolution is only a theory. There is a mountain of data supporting it, but since we (read: “scientists”) have not been able to adequately propose a model for *how* it works, it should not be thought of as if it were like gravity. I could elaborate a bit on that, but not now - this post is long. If you’ve read this far, congratulations and thanks.
That is all, this post is long and probably entirely too tangental, but there’s my 2 cents (more like 2 dollars) on the issue.
Comment by Wondertwin — April 24, 2006 @ 10:10 am
This is really interesting…I wonder if anyone knows of a good book or website that explores the history of science, with roots in philosophy? I’d appreciate the reccomendation to further explore the relationship between the two. PS I’m teaching 7th grade science to my homeschooler and have included ID, warts and all!
Comment by denise martin — April 26, 2006 @ 8:03 pm
Denise,
The Institute for the Study of Nature is starting up a website with some good articles available right now that would be helpful. As for book recommendations, I will have asked Hierothee for some ideas. There are some good general books, like Stephen Barr’s whom I generally like very much. However, I do think that he unintentionally falls prey to some materialist/mechanistic presuppositions so without a critical eye some of his thinking could lead one down an almost Kantian path.
Comment by David — April 26, 2006 @ 8:21 pm
This synopsis requires much more nuancing so don’t take it as gospel, but here’s my current survey of the land:
There are, as far as I can tell, two different orthodox perspectives on the relation between philosophy and science, stemming essentially from epistemological differences. One can take Stanley Jaki’s view, for instance, stemming from Pierre Duhem, which lauds the development of modern science but shows its roots in Catholic theology. This view tends to be, at least implicitly, favorable to the separation of philosophy from theology, and then of science from philosophy. It is very strong on the proper demarcations between them. It holds that modern science does indeed penetrate the inner workings of the material universe in a deeper manner than any form of pre-modern science. If one wants to push this view, then obviously anything by Jaki is worth picking up. He has an extensive catalog to choose from. This view is a stronger form of realism than the alternative mentioned below. T.F. Torrance, from my cursory readings of him, might also fit in this mold.
The other view stems from phenomenology. This view holds that modern science is tied less to a uniquely penetrating analysis of the universe than it is to a peculiarly techne-oriented mindset. Husserl would not have put the matter this bluntly, of course, but it is present implicitly in him and came out in his followers. Alexander Koyre has some interesting stuff in this regard (though I don’t believe he was an orthodox Catholic). I think that this view influenced the ressourcement theologians, who were not happy about the separation of philosophy from theology, and of science from philosophy. Bouyer’s “Cosmos,” if it is properly understood, is all about this (note that Jaki does not care for this book). Bouyer roots all human thought and culture, including modern science, in theurgy, both historically and by reason of the natural dialectic of the human mind.
Another book, which I have difficulty categorizing, is Wolfgang Smith’s “The Wisdom of Ancient Cosmology.” This is a highly intriguing series of essays. He presents some rad-trad notions which may or may not be an issue for some (I get a kick out of his “perennialist” ontology, but the average Thomist probably wouldn’t care for it).
I can think of no books though that might serve as reading options for seventh graders, however. All of the above would have to be translated to a seventh grade level of understanding.
Comment by Hierothee — April 27, 2006 @ 10:04 am
Denise,
Another title that provides some good background on the history of thought is Diogenes Allen’s Philosophy for Understanding Theology. While it is not directly focused on the issue from the perspective of the history of science, it does provide a very good summary of why and how thinking has (d)evolved to the fragmented epistemology we have today. Though it does treat, if somewhat obliquely, some aspects of this issue vis-a-vis the history of science.
Comment by David — April 27, 2006 @ 10:13 am