Cosmos-Liturgy-Sex

A couple of months back we posted on a debate among pro-life theologians, scientists and ethicists involving an attempt to produce stem cells as from an embryo, but without creating an embryo. The technique is called ANT/OAR for Altered Nuclear Transfer/Oocyte Assisted Reprogramming. You can visit the above link for more background but in essence this method would use a variation of the technique used in cloning in which the nucleus is removed from an egg (oocyte) and replaced by the nucleus from a somatic cell.

Once inserted into the oocyte, the egg’s cytoplasm begins to reprogram the nucleus’s genetic structure from a state of unipotency (i.e. it can only generate that particular somatic cell) to one of totipotency (i.e. a zygote, which is a single cell embryo).

In earlier ANT proposals the alteration of the somatic nucleus prevented the trophectoderm (the outer layer of cells in a nascent embryo that will give rise to the placenta) from properly forming. Most of the pro-life OAR proponents rejected this earlier proposal as the generation of a deformed embryo. OAR is different from cloning and other earlier methods of ANT in that the somatic nucleus is altered prior to insertion such that, according to the proponents, it never forms an embryo. The alteration skips the stage of totipotency and the cell simply generates pluripotent cells (which are cells that can become any type of human cell, i.e. embryonic like stem cells). However, as I mentioned in the previous post, not everyone is convinced that one can be so sure that the entity produced by OAR is not just a deformed embryo. Thus the debate: how do you know when it is an embryo?

The Winter edition of Communio is about to hit the streets with its second issue on this debate, this time with both sides represented. However, lucky for us they have already posted the articles on-line (go here and scroll down to Part V). In this post I will provide a very short summary of each of the articles:

The first is by Fr. José Granados D.C.J.M., and is entitled ANT-OAR: Is Its Underlying Philosophy of Biology Sound?. Fr. Granados is a professor of theology at the JPII Institute in D.C. He begins by summarizing the first ANT proposal (ANT-1) and shows using systems biology that one cannot say that an embryo is not formed. He then applies his methodology to the ANT-OAR proposal, again arguing that it fails to show that an embryo is not formed. Succinctly, he argues that one can find no definite point at which a human being is formed; rather, it is a continuous process. He says that the OAR proposal assumes that the entity formed from somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT, or the cloning method) would not be a zygote until the oocyte finishes reprogramming the somatic nucleus. Fr. Granados replies that rather, systems biology would say that it is a zygote from the moment the nucleus fuses with the oocyte. Thus, as with ANT-1, we once again have a deformed embryo and so ANT/OAR cannot be morally licit.

The second article, Joint Statement on the OAR Proposal: A Response to Criticisms, is by Msgr. Stuart Swetland (he should sound familiar) and William Saunders. More or less, I previously provided a summary of this paper here and here. They are responding to David Schindler’s criticism of the Joint Statement as I described in my first post (again, see Makings of a Pro-life Rift?). However, in a nutshell the Swetland/Saunders paper provides a philosophical argument based upon the observable data. They argue that the mere mechanical insertion of a diploid nucleus (a nucleus having the full set of genetic information) into the environment of an enucleated oocyte (an egg with its haploid nucleus removed) cannot reasonably be considered a zygote. They discuss examples of cases where this happens in which the result is clearly not a human being. Thus, they say that the human substantial form cannot reasonably be considered present unless the cell possesses all of a human’s epigenetic primordia (all that which is required to become a complete human being). Central to their argument is the issue of moral certainty. They admit it is reasonable to suggest that the product might be a zygote but moral certainty requires only reasonable doubt and they find it reasonably doubtful that the entity is a zygote.

The third article, ANT-OAR: A Morally Acceptable Means for Deriving Pluripotent Stem Cells. A Reply to Criticisms, is by E. Christian Brugger. Brugger is a professor of theology at IPS in Arlington VA. He is also responding to Schindler’s criticism of the Joint Statement. He spends much of his article criticizing Schindler’s arguments (Brugger appears to have taken Schindler’s criticisms as sharp and so he responds with even more vigor). His essential point is that because the product of ANT/OAR does not express itself as an embryo it cannot be assumed to be an embryo.

Adrian Walker, who used to teach at the JPII Institute (and translate a lot of von Balthasar’s works), now is associate editor of Communio. He has two articles. The first, Reasonable Doubts. A Reply to E. Christian Brugger, is of course, a response to Brugger. Brugger had called into question Schindler’s Aristotelian acumen, accusing him of dualism. Walker sets out to show that Schindler was right and Brugger wrong. Walker provides compelling (for me) philosophical support for Fr. Granados’s assertion that the fusion of somatic nucleus with the enucleated oocyte is the beginning of a human being (in the case of SCNT). If this is the case then OAR, which presupposes a zygote comes into being only at the end of reprogramming, is wrong. He says:

The fusion of the cellular materials results, in other words, in an entity that puts itself in the zygote epigenetic state through self-directed action. In other words, the simplest interpretation of the facts is that a new human being has come into existence and is running itself through the epigenetic reprogramming process.

In a footnote, which ought to be in the main text because of its importance, he states:

If we do not follow this interpretation, then we have to deal with at least two problematic implications. First, we commit ourselves to saying that the process of fertilization is not the beginning of human life, but is itself an intermediate stage prior to the completion of the zygotic epigenetic state. Second, we have the difficulty of explaining what is the ontological subject of the obviously teleological, directed process of forming the zygotic epigenetic state. If this subject is not already a human being, then how can it direct itself into the epigenetic state of a human being?

I don’t think his first concern is necessarily problematic, as I understand it anyway. We know that fertilization can lead to several pathological situations (e.g. hydatidiform moles) in which a human being is not formed (at least we assume so). However, the second is compelling. In other words, if the human being itself is not providing the self-directed reprogramming of the cell’s genetic structure, what is? What do we call something whose end state of development is a human being?

I think that St. Thomas Aquinas can be helpful here. Basing himself on Aristotle’s biological theory, he thought that the conception process was an extended one (40 days for a male and 90 days for a female) in which the fetus developed through a succession of ‘forms’ beginning with a vegetative soul and progressing through an animal soul. It was at the end of this conception process in which God immediately created and infused the fetus with a human soul (cf. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on III Sentences 3:5:2). Nevertheless, he said that abortion was always a grave evil because the telos, the end, of these intermediate souls was a human being. From this it would seem that even if the new entity (after nuclear insertion but before reprogramming) were something other than a human being, the active potency for self directed movement toward a human being (which is only interrupted by the altered gene in the case of ANT/OAR) would, following St. Thomas, still require the protection afforded to human beings.

Walker’s second article, Who Are the Real Aristotelians? A Response to Edward J. Furton, is a response to the editor of the National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly who had written a rather energetic reply to one of Walker’s earlier articles. If a bit of bitterness between Schindler and Brugger was not evident in their discussion, it definitely will not be missed here. Walker’s second article addresses three issues that he says Furton misunderstood in his critique. Walker essentially restates the arguments from his reply to Brugger, addressed specifically to Furton’s critique.

The sixth and final article, Agere sequitur esse: What Does It Mean? A Response to Father Austriaco, is from David Schindler. He is responding to Fr. Nicanor Austriaco, O.P. who had criticized Schindler’s critical reply to the Joint Statement. As the title suggests, Schindler is critical of what he sees as Austriaco’s essential reversal of the Thomist maxim act follows being. As such Schindler believes that Fr. Austriaco confuses the ontological priority of substantial form over matter and as the organizing principle of the hylomorphic entity. Thus Schindler finds that Austriaco succumbs to a materialistic determinism. Schindler’s argument follows the same logic as Walker’s articles, but he provides a very detailed (and helpful) tutorial on the implications of hylomorphism for this issue. He does not address the Swetland/Saunders argument other than to say that he believes his argument in this article applies similarly to their claim. He does not address the issue of moral certainty but I do not doubt he could develop a case.

In the end, I think that Adrian Walker’s response to Christian Brugger is, for me, the most compelling argument. It has shifted my previous ambivalence in the direction of the Communio consensus. I, of course, will wait to see what comes about in the next round.

I think that these articles provide very helpful clarifications and in my mind move the discussion closer to resolution. However, I do hope that the dialogue can become a bit more charitable.

I was not privy to the initial oral discussions which may have set the stage for antagonism, but in reading Walker’s and Schindler’s first articles responding to the ANT/OAR proposal, I can understand why some of the ANT/OAR proponents may have misread their intentions as aggressive animosity. Thus, not a few of the responses were some what ad hominem and I believe, exhibited an incorrect understanding of the Communio school’s arguments. This, I believe, led to an all too quick dismissal of the Communio position as obscurantist and scientifically ignorant. I do not believe this to be fair. Though, I will admit that it is not unusual for people to come away from discussions with some of these Communio authors with a sense that they are anti-technology. I can see how all these factors have come together to leave us in the situation we now find ourselves.

If the parties concerned do not put aside perceptions of personal affronts with this round of responses and focus on really understanding and addressing the valid arguments of the other side, the next round of replies will not move the discussion any further forward. Rather they will end up being simply restatements of current positions with more antagonistic rhetoric. I would suggest that the Swetland/Saunders article, if not the most compelling, should at least be held up as the model for charitable discourse. Here is my recommendation. Write the first draft venting one’s spleens if he must, but in the editing process first pray the Litany of Humility, and then, rewrite.