Cosmos-Liturgy-Sex

Charles Haynes writes an op-ed piece for the Salem Oregon Statesman Journal this week on the first amendment. We are purposefully not a political blog, but of course any attempt to isolate faith and morals from public life is a purely artificial, and even dangerous, endeavor. What is of interest in Haynes article is his view freedom. He represents the popular American perspective of freedom and what this means in a free society for any attempts to manage public expression.

Haynes appears to take the absolutist view that freedom of the press means that no form of expression can legitimately be curtailed. His point of departure, of course, is the Islamic cartoon controversy. He seems more concerned over the recent Vatican statement responding to these cartoons, in which the Holy See says that freedom of speech does not include the right to offend others, than he does over the violent response of some Islamists. Haynes goes on to conflate this statement with various European attempts to legislate against “hate speech.” For him, these are all problematic attitudes cut from the same cloth.

He contrasts these freedom stifling views with his understanding of freedom in the United States. Citing a 1940 Supreme Court decision (Cantwell v. Connecticut) in which freedom of expression was found to trump religious sensibilities, Haynes concludes that the freedom to offend is at the core of religious freedom in America. He then quotes the majority opinion and summarizes it by saying:

Justice Roberts had it right. It is always messy and often painful, but only a society that protects the right of all voices to be heard — however offensive or unpopular — can call itself a free nation.

His grounding of religious freedom in such a late decision seems questionable. Furthermore, his conflation of the Vatican statement with European legislative efforts fails to make some important distinctions. Having read the Vatican statement, I do not recall it suggesting legislative limits on expression. Rather, it was an appeal for the just use of freedoms. In determining the just use of freedom, one can in fact make distinctions that Haynes seems not willing or able to make. For example, while there is certainly some gray area, one can still distinguish between professing beliefs that some find offensive, and a purposeful belittling and demeaning of others. These distinctions can and should be made and (once again) incorporated into journalistic standards of conduct.

The fundamental problem with Haynes position is that he appears to believe that freedom is an all or nothing proposition. Unfortunately, he does not state the rationale for his thinking, other than obliquely by example, so I must guess. One or more of these are possibilities:

1) We cannot trust the government so, fearing unbridled oppression, we cannot put any limits on public expression.

2) We have to fear the tyranny of the masses.

3) In a pluralistic society it is impossible to arrive at any agreeable moral norms so we shouldn’t try.

4) Freedom is an end in itself.

To begin with, suspicion does not make for a healthy society. Healthy social life requires trust and suspicion is its antithesis. The French Revolution’s Reign of Terror and Stalin’s Great Purge are extreme examples of pathological suspicion taken to their illogical conclusions. Our structures of government have generally proven to be sufficiently robust to accommodate limits on absolute liberty in the past. Until relatively recently we had strict limits on pornography and we still do over certain types (e.g. child). So far, the jack boots have never taken over the presses. In fact, it is more the case that the onslaught of unrestrained freedom of the press, particularly in terms of pornography, has damaged society. The libertinism of pornography is part of the problem which is now taking a heavy toll on the family and society, to the point we have seen for sometime troubling societal instabilities arise. We also have limits on political speech such as that advocating violence, insurrection, threatening a public figure, treason, etc. In other words, there never has been absolute liberty of expression and for a stable society there never can be. I believe that the current libertinism has come to the point that it is now a threat to social stability.

Fear of tyranny from the majority is a suspicion that would seem to undermine the legitimacy of democracy itself. Nevertheless, even if it is a real concern the above discussion still applies. Absolute permissiveness is not the answer; libertinism is a much greater threat.

It is true that in a pluralistic society it can become difficult to agree on moral norms but this does not mean that capitulation to moral relativism is the answer. Difficult does not mean impossible.

Finally, we need to recognize that freedom is not a end but a means for seeking the truth. To be authentic, freedom must serve the truth. When freedom becomes an ultimate good, it becomes an idol which must be served at the expense of greater goods. In the case of abortion, the greater good that we end up offering on the altar to the gods of choice is a human life.

Haynes’s is an overly simplistic view that, in the end, will crush itself under the burden of its own weight. His is the view of freedom as liberty from any kind of restraint. By necessity, this erroneous view leads to false dichotomies in which one person’s rights can be had only at the expense of another’s rights. Because freedom is the ultimate good that everyone must pursue, it reduces to a Nietzschean will to power where only the strongest can win. Paradoxically, freedom without truth leads to the idolization of man, or more specifically the idolization of his will to power.