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Cosmos-Liturgy-Sex

January 18, 2006

ANT/OAR: Response to Criticisms

Filed under: Abortion,Anthropology,Culture,Religion and Science — David @ 8:18 PM

From what I have heard from several of the signatories to the statement described in my first post, it is clear that some of them have no patience for the criticisms I summarized in my last post. In general, some of these proponents appear to believe that the answer is obvious and the case closed. However, others, while fairly sure of their position, recognize the criticisms as an important step in a dialogue which must take place as the moral liceity of this proposed procedure is investigated and hopefully, a consensus is reached. Here is how some of the latter appear to be headed in addressing the current concerns.

In general, it appears that they would sympathize with Schindler’s concerns that many scientists view the world in an essentially mechanistic manner and often are detached from moral concerns. Schindler’s caution about the implications of capitulating to the use of the oocyte as a means of production is a valid caution. More discussion on this issue is warranted but as far as their statement goes, there is no reason not to continue the investigation on non-human cells to try to determine whether or not a zygote is formed in this procedure.

It seems that Schindler’s first two issues lead to one fundamental question to be answered. Specifically, does the lack of epigenetic primordia for internally directed growth of a human being convincingly indicate the non-existence of a human being? The second issue raised by the Burke-Pullicino-Richard article seems to weigh in Schindler’s favor. They state that biologically the result of OAR is really a defective zygote. The questions that must be asked are what constitutes a human being at the level of a zygote and can the external manifestation at such an early stage determine with sufficient confidence that the entity produced by OAR is not a human being? Thus, there is the question of the being of the cell resulting from OAR and a second question is the certainty associated with the answer to the first.

In determining the being of the OAR created cell, Schindler argues that one cannot rely on empirical observation alone but must go beyond the empirical to the metaphysical. He is correct; the Magisterium also, while not relying totally on scientific data, does take it into account for these types of determinations. The context of Evangelium vitae 60 suggests that the Magisterium considers it credible that a soul is present in a zygote based both upon the scientific evidence and the philosophical understanding that the soul is the substantial form of the human person. But since there is no certainty that the product of OAR is a zygote, one is left with the question: what is the threshold of confidence we should be considering? Does one have to rule out any possibility that the cell is a nascent human being, albeit one sufficiently deformed that there is only one thing he or she can do and that is to produce pluripotent cells?

Since absolute certainty is not possible, the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith (CDF) document on procured abortion, footnote 19, seems to indicate the direction one should take on the issue of certainty. Here the Magisterium agrees that it is outside the competence of science to prove the existence of a soul. It does not take a position on when the soul enters the body but asserts that destruction of an embryo is still destroying human life which nobody disputes (the issue abortion advocates say is personhood). The CDF goes on to say that even if the presence of the soul cannot be determined with certainty, it suffices that the presence of the soul be probable (Latin probabilis, which carries the sense of “credible.” Probable in the sense of “likely” would be better rendered verisimilis). Evangelium vitae, more than two decades later, asserts much the same thing: “Furthermore, what is at stake is so important that, from the standpoint of moral obligation, the mere probability that a human person is involved would suffice to justify an absolutely clear prohibition of any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo.” Both of these documents make it clear that the zygote is human life which is not the case with the product of OAR, otherwise there would be no debate. So what is the threshold of credibility? It clearly cannot be absolute certainty, otherwise many acts could never be permitted. For example, a woman ever doing or consuming anything that could injure or kill her baby if she were pregnant. There is almost no case in which a woman knows with “absolute” certainty that she is not pregnant. Rather, both the Magisterium as shown above and the moral tradition, even in the case of life, set the threshold to one of needing to remove only reasonable doubt.

This leads directly to the questions, what is a human being and can this be discerned at the level of a zygote? Schindler is right that being precedes act and in suggesting that the lack of human action, in this case zygotic activity, does not necessarily prove the non-existence of a zygote. In fact, Burke-Pullicino-Richard have asserted that the product of OAR is a “crippled embryo incapable of fully developing into a human infant.” Certainly, one should consider the possibility. However, none of the critics would argue with the assertion that the somatic nucleus itself is not a human being. It does not on its own, have the potency to become a human person. Thus, a somatic nucleus need not be treated with the same dignity as a human person. What is it that enables the nucleus to become a human being? Does the simple insertion of any diploid nucleus, taken from a human cell, into the environment of an enucleated oocyte, per se, become a human being? Does this mechanical transfer of the nucleus itself bestow new being upon the entity? The proponents believe that there compelling reasons to think not.

There are various defects arising from fertilization which cannot be considered human beings. For example, hydatidiform moles are masses of growing tissue which are genetically distinct from the mother and arise when the maternal nucleus is lost and remaining are solely two paternal nuclei. This cell from the start does not have the epigenetic primordia necessary to become a human person. In fact, only when these epigenetic primordia are present do we find that a human being develops. From the external evidence then, it appears that the human being comes into existence when the enucleated oocyte reprograms the nucleus into a totipotent zygote. This reprogramming provides it with all of the epigenetic primordia necessary for inward development into a mature human being. But they argue one need not reduce this to a purely empirical observation. There is philosophical rationale for this interpretation.

This reasoning can be seen in asking the question, what would be the difference between a defective embryo and a pluripotent stem cell produced from the transfer of a somatic nucleus into an enucleated oocyte? Because the soul is the form of the human body and the body expresses the soul, it is reasonable to assume that nothing other than a cell with the required epigenetic primordia is capable of receiving a human substantial form, i.e. a soul. The proponents do not believe it seems probable (i.e. credible) to assume that the mere change of environment, without any change to the nucleus’ genetic transcription could be considered a human person. Nor does it seem to them, reasonable, that the new cell that looks and acts like a pluripotent stem cell and has only the capacity for producing more of the same with no further differentiation could receive a human substantial form or be considered a human being. Thus, they believe that Schindler and the others set the bar of confidence higher than does the Magisterium. The philosophical reasoning and scientific evidence do not provide for them “probable” or “credible” reasons to believe that the product of OAR is a human being.

In considering the criticisms of Burke-Pullicino-Richard, it would seem that their first concern that the proponents are underestimating the reprogramming power of an oocyte and so OAR will not work is exactly the purpose of the proposal. If they are correct, one will only know by implementing the research program on non-human cells. Some of the proponents agree that the remaining three issues are excellent questions which should be resolved through open dialogue aided by the empirical results of the proposed investigation. They would remind that their statement limited research to non-human cells until established beyond a reasonable doubt that no zygote is formed and that the questions will not be answered without the empirical data.

Personally, I am currently ambivalent on this issue. I would like to see this discussion continue, hopefully in as charitable a tone so that real understanding might follow. I would wholly expect to see further insights raised on both sides of the issue that will eventually allow one to draw a rationally informed, conclusion on OAR’s morally liceity. However, from what I currently understand, I am not sure that at this stage I would agree with any side that asserted that the answer to the question is clear and the case closed

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5 Comments »

  1. what is the threshold of confidence we should be considering? Does one have to rule out any possibility that the cell is a nascent human being, albeit one sufficiently deformed that there is only one thing he or she can do and that is to produce pluripotent cells?

    Yes, wouldn’t we really need to rule out *any* possibility? And what if it turns out, as I suspect, that this can’t really be ruled out, based on the metaphysics of it all. And maybe that’s where the attention should be, more on the ethics/metaphysics and less on the empirical.

    And what about the argument re: use of the human egg in this way? Granted, it turns out to be the least interesting, but who has addressed it?

    Comment by monica — January 19, 2006 @ 8:48 AM

  2. Monica -

    Yes, wouldn’t we really need to rule out any possibility?

    I completely follow your instincts on this; my first reaction is the same as yours because the possibility of destroying innocent human life is so abhorrent. However, it seems that absolute certainty is not the Magisterium’s critieria for morally licit judgments; even in cases where life is involved. I think that this is simply because absolute certainty usually seems to be reserved to truths gained solely from divine revelation and perhaps some from philosophical reflection. For example, for some end of life decisions, certain judgments about what is extraordinary care are based upon beliefs about the course of a terminal condition. The course of the illness can never be an absolute certainty but rather usually falls into the category of being beyond a reasonable doubt. Perhaps one could call this absolute moral certainty? In the case of OAR, I am not sure if it is possible to reach this level of moral certainty based upon the philosophical and empirical evidence but at this point I am still listening to those who think that it is.

    In the end this might have been a mute exercise. Something that Robby George has pointed out, which I did not mention in my posts but should have, is that interestingly enough, many of the opponents to ANT/OAR are those who are pushing for government funding of embryonic stem cell research. Why? It appears that they recognize that pluripotent cells will never “behave” well enough to be used in therapies (currently they always form tumors). Rather, they are only useful after they have become specialized cells in the course of normal fetal development in a natural or artificial environment, usually after at least a few weeks to a couple of months. In other words, the embryonic stem cell research proponents are not interested in embryonic stem cells after all; they are actually interested in embryo harvesting. Thus, a source of pluripotent cells other than from an embryo is a threat to their agenda. A morally acceptable source of pluripotent cells would halt the process of the deadening of society’s current ethical queasiness with the idea embryonic destruction.

    >>And what about the argument re: use of the human egg in this way?

    I agree with you and Dr. Schindler on this issue. I think that it would require some sort of artificial environment which could mimic the enucleated oocyte for this concern to be overcome.

    Comment by David — January 19, 2006 @ 2:20 PM

  3. For example, for some end of life decisions, certain judgments about what is extraordinary care are based upon beliefs about the course of a terminal condition. The course of the illness can never be an absolute certainty but rather usually falls into the category of being beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Right, yeah, I agree with you that there are some cases when judgments without certainty are permitted to be made about foregoing or discontinuing treatment. I wonder if a closer approximation of the situation would be in the clinical need to access something like “brain death”?

    But then, I further wonder if it’s really unlike both of those types of situations. Why? Because in clinical situations we sometimes have to act without a lot of time to deliberate. In these dire medical situations, a move is being made (or a treatment foregone, whatever) because we believe it is for the overall good of the person.

    I wonder if this would be different and perhaps new category of issues because, while determining where there is or isn’t life with (hopefully) moral certainty has to be done clinically to determine what is for good of the person involved, with ANT/OAR we are not trying to make a good decision about care. No, we are trying to make a decision about creating, and using. IOW, we can’t prevent the need to act (or forego acting) when it comes to the medical care of a person. But we certainly can prevent creating, using, and destroying what may be a life in the absence of certainty that it isn’t a human life.

    Of course, I understand those in both camps are concerned about that, which is of course, immensely comforting.

    In other words, the embryonic stem cell research proponents are not interested in embryonic stem cells after all; they are actually interested in embryo harvesting.

    Yes, some people look at me like I’m a wearing a tin-foil hat when I voice this type of concern. I read several months ago that what is actually preferred to embryo cells (read, embryos) are early fetal cells. It is a horrifying thought to imagine what is being done already, let alone what is to come.

    Comment by monica — January 19, 2006 @ 4:40 PM

  4. But then, I further wonder if it’s really unlike both of those types of situations.

    Monica – thanks, this is an important distinction. I discussed it with one of the proponents and he also seems to agree this could be an important enough distinction that might make the parallel insufficient. More to think about.

    You are also correct that the brain death issue is a closer parallel. I purposefully avoided it because I did not have time to refresh myself on the recent controversy over brain death.

    Comment by David — January 20, 2006 @ 1:36 PM

  5. [...] The second article, Joint Statement on the OAR Proposal: A Response to Criticisms, is by Msgr. Stuart Swetland (he should sound familiar) and William Saunders. More or less, I previously provided a summary of this paper here and here. They are responding to David Schindler’s criticism of the Joint Statement as I described in my first post (again, see Makings of a Pro-life Rift?). However, in a nutshell the Swetland/Saunders paper provides a philosophical argument based upon the observable data. They argue that the mere mechanical insertion of a diploid nucleus (a nucleus having the full set of genetic information) into the environment of an enucleated oocyte (an egg with its monoploid nucleus removed) cannot reasonably be considered a zygote. They discuss examples of cases where this happens in which the result is clearly not a human being. Thus, they say that the human substantial form cannot reasonably be considered present unless the cell possesses all of a human’s epigenetic primordia (all that which is required to become a complete human being). Central to their argument is the issue of moral certainty. They admit it is reasonable to suggest that the product might be a zygote but moral certainty requires only reasonable doubt and they find it reasonably doubtful that the entity is a zygote. [...]

    Pingback by COSMOS-LITURGY-SEX » When is it a Human Life? — March 20, 2006 @ 11:22 AM

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